An integrative model of the management of hospital physician relationships by Trybou, Jeroen et al.
 1 
AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF THE MANAGEMENT OF HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Hospital Physician Relationships (HPRs) are of major importance to the health care 
sector. Drawing on agency theory and social exchange theory, we argue that both 
economic and noneconomic integration strategies are important to effective management 
of HPRs. We developed a model of related antecedents and outcomes and conducted a 
systematic review to assess the evidence base of both integration strategies and their 
interplay. We found that more emphasis should be placed on financial risk sharing, trust 
and physician organizational commitment. 
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The management of HPRs is an important area of academic research and a main concern 
of hospital executives, given the impact on quality of provided care (Cortese, & Smoldt, 
2007), hospitals’ financial success (Goes & Zhan, 1995) and cost-effective health care 
delivery (Ciliberto & Dranove, 2006). Prior research has offered a number of important 
insights into the management of HPRs, ranging from the possible role of incentives 
(Shafrin, 2009) and equity ownership (Mitchell, 2008) to the development of a physician 
liaison program (Mark, Evans, Schur & Guterman, 1998) and the importance of effective 
communication (Cohn, 2009). Two distinct approaches to align the medical staff with the 
hospital have characterized much of the literature on HPRs. The first approach is rooted 
in the economic literature, building on the model of the homo economicus, in which 
alignment is realized by financial means (e.g. Bodenheimer, 1996). The second approach 
represents a more sociological perspective, emphasizing the cooperative nature of their 
relationship (e.g. Tschannen & Kalisch, 2009). Although both approaches have recently 
been described as economic and noneconomic integration (Burns & Muller, 2008), up to 
now there has not been an attempt to integrate both insights. We attempt to fill this 
research gap by developing a conceptual model resulting in a practical understanding of 
the management of HPRs. Building on agency theory and social exchange theory we 
studied economic, noneconomic integration and the potential interaction effect between 
both. We argue that both strategies should be seen as complementary, rather than a 
substitution to each other. Consequently this leads to interesting additional propositions 
as the interesting questions have more to do with the anticipated interaction effect than 
their single effect on hospital performance. In today’s turbulent healthcare environment, 
providers are confronted with contemporaneous pressures to contain costs and improve 
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health care quality. As a result, neither hospitals nor physicians will be able to meet the 
current challenges without closer cooperation and increased integration (Budetti, Shortell, 
Waters, Alexander, Burns, Gillies et al., 2002). The current study responds to these 
challenges by increasing the insight in the management of HPRs with a theoretical 
contribution and a review of the relevant literature. We argue that previous research has 
oversimplified the relationship between hospitals and physicians. Although our review 
indicate that economic and noneconomic integration affect HPRs individually, only few 
studies have focused on the different alignment strategies and further research is needed. 
However, no empirical study or conceptual article has combined both management 
approaches. Our aim is thus to increase understanding by proposing a conceptual model, 
drawing on economic and social explanations of HPRs. Antecedent factors that influence 
the type of integration strategy used are identified, and the subsequent impact of these 
strategies on performance outcomes are reviewed. To develop our argument of 
complementary, we incorporated the construct of organizational commitment (physician 
hospital commitment). Specifically, we argue that physician hospital commitment is 
influenced by both noneconomic and economic integration. Furthermore, we argue that 
physician hospital commitment is an important intermediate construct influencing 
hospital performance.  
We tested our arguments by a systematic review of the literature on the management of 
HPRs. Despite the growing popularity of strategies to alter hospital-physician 
relationships, our review indicates that few studies have evaluated the effectiveness of 
these strategies in improving hospital performance. Our findings indicate that more 
research is needed to determine the effect of both economic and noneconomic integration 
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strategies on physician behavior and hospital performance. This research should focus on 
both quality and financial aspects of hospital performance. Next to research focusing on 
the effect of these strategies individually, we argue that more emphasis should be placed 
on the complementarity view of integration. Future research incorporating this interaction 
aspect is a future research priority. 
 
NEED FOR INTEGRATION 
 
Over the past several decades, health care providers are confronted with continuous 
pressures to contain costs and simultaneously improve health care quality. The 
confluence of these forces increases the importance of cost-effective collaboration, but 
simultaneously threatens the assumption that physicians and hospitals share common 
interests creating a greater need for integration (Berenson et al., 2007; Budetti & 
Zuckerman, 2001). First, the financial relationship between both changed significantly. 
Traditionally physicians have been relatively independent of hospitals and have used 
them as workshops in which to carry out their professional services. The HPR was 
characterized by unique, symbiotic interdependence in which the two parties had 
compatible incentives to increase the volume of care using the latest technology, while 
maximizing the professional autonomy of the physician (Pauly & Redisch, 1973). This 
professional autonomy was reinforced by the fragmented financing system, which 
ignored the interrelatedness of the actions of physicians and hospitals in the treatment of 
their patients. Physicians were paid on a fee-for-service basis and hospitals were paid on 
the basis of costs incurred (Harris, Hicks & Kelly, 1992). However, the financial 
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relationship between hospitals and physicians has changed dramatically. Not only have 
hospital margins declined due to increased complexity, rising costs and more restrictive 
reimbursement schemes (Cardinaels, Roodhooft, & van Herck, 2004), hospitals are also 
confronted with increased financial accountability for the delivered care, introduced by 
prospective payment and forms of managed competition (KirkmanLiff, Huijsman, 
vanderGrinten & Brink, 1997; Schut & van Doorslaer, 1999). Furthermore, recognition 
that the health care system suffers from serious gaps in quality has stimulated a broad 
array of public-, and private-sector initiatives to improve performance (Ryan, 2009). 
Value based purchasing (pay for quality) and public reporting of hospital quality have 
become the locus of debate and have emerged as the most widely advocated strategies 
(Lindenauer, Remus, Roman, Rothberg, Benjamin, Ma et al., 2007). As a result, hospitals 
and physicians are no longer insulated from the cost consequences of their clinical 
decisions, and the historical separation of administrative and clinical decision making is 
being eliminated (Goes & Zhan, 1995). Unfortunately, conflicting incentives between 
physicians and hospitals are often cited as a major obstacle to effective collaboration 
(Goldsmith, 2007; Mark et al., 1998) and moved HPRs from symbiotic to competitive 
interdependence (Berenson, Ginsburg & May, 2007; Burns, Andersen & Shortell, 1990). 
Finally, the fact that many services performed in hospitals can now safely and 
conveniently be performed in ambulatory settings makes the management of HPRs even 
more important. Considering this important evolution, physicians become potentially 
owners of entities directly competing with hospitals for delivering outpatient services, 
potentially resulting in a new medical arms race and zero-sum competition (Berenson, 
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Bodenheimer & Pham, 2006a; Berenson et al., 2007; Casalino & Robinson, 2003; 
Casalino, November, Berenson & Pham, 2008; Porter & Teisberg, 2006).  
 
INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 
Based on the findings of the researchers of the Health System Integration Study (Gillies, 
& Shortell, 1993) and drawing on academic and consulting literature, Burns and Muller 
(2008) recently have categorized hospital’s efforts to better align their medical staff. 
They make a distinction between ‘hard’ economic integration strategies such as equity 
ownership (Mitchell, 2008) and ‘soft’ non-economic integration strategies such as 
physician involvement in hospital decision making (Ibay, 2007). On the one hand, 
economic integration encompasses hospitals provision of monetary payments to 
physicians to provide, manage or improve clinical services and to perform organizational 
activities (Burns et al. 2008). The arguments for such linkages are based on the premise 
that by strengthening the organizational ties between the hospital and physician groups, 
each can effectively influence the other to promote greater consistency between practice 
behavior, organizational strategy and the organizational goals (Zuckerman, Hilberman, 
Andersen, Burns, Alexander & Torrens, 1998; Shortell, Waters, Clarke, & Budetti, 
1998). On the other hand, noneconomic integration refers to hospitals’ efforts to enlist 
and retain physicians by making their facilities more attractive and accessible, their 
operations more efficient and convenient, their decision-making processes more 
participative and responsive, and their staffing better trained (Burns et al. 2008). These 
non-economic integration strategies emphasize the needed cooperative behavior in their 
symbiotic relationship and recognize physicians’ professional career needs to build, 
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maintain, and expand their practices (Shortell, Alexander, Budetti, Burns, Gillies, Waters 
et al., 2001). It aims at making the hospital more attractive for physicians by improving 
the hospital’s internal environment and addressing physicians’ related concerns 
(Berenson, Bodenheimer & Pham, 2006b; Berenson et al., 2007). This approach is routed 
in the belief that emphasis should be placed more on the underlying cooperative 
relationship than on structural, contractual alternatives (Cohn et al., 2007; Gillies, 
Zuckerman, Burns, Shortell, Alexander, Budetti, et al., 2001). 
 
RETHINKING PHYSICIAN HOSPITAL INTEGRATION 
Our conceptual model builds further on this practical classification of alignment 
strategies and uses agency theory to study economic integration and social exchange 
theory to study non-economic integration strategies. The elaboration of both integration 
forms with the theoretical concepts increases insight and enables us to structure the 
divergent nature of previous empirical research which helps us to determine an agenda 
for future research. In our model, as illustrated in figure 1, we argue that risk and trust are 
two important antecedents to respectively economic and noneconomic integration. We 
also incorporate a physician group level as physicians often operate as quasi-independent 
professionals in a physician group setting. This group level results in risk pooling (Gold, 
1999) and the blending of financial incentives (Robinson et al., 2004) influencing the risk 
antecedent and economic integration strategies. Subsequently, we argue that these 
integration strategies have an impact on hospital performance. In our model, we make a 
distinction between a direct effect of the various strategies on hospital performance and 
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an indirect effect through physician hospital commitment drawing on the principle of 
reciprocity. 
In our model, both economic and non-economic integration are included, as there is a 
potential interaction effect. The theoretical argument is that by strengthening the ties of 
the medical staff with the hospital, the hospital is more attuned to the interest, values and 
priorities of physicians (Alexander, Waters, Burns, Shortell, Gillies, Budetti et al., 2001).  
We argue that by taking into account the physicians’ point of view in hospital decision-
making there is an effect on the noneconomic integration strategies. However, it should 
be noted that when HPRs are considered as a development process in a longitudinal 
sense, performance outcomes can cause feedback and have a recursive relationship with 
the integration strategies. Similarly, the integration strategies can also have a recursive 
relationship with the antecedents. Therefore, we note that this model is a partial model 
and cannot represent all possible antecedents and consequences of HPR management.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
METHOD 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of theory to management research (Colquitt, & 
Zapata-Phelan, 2007). To increase understanding of the divergent literature in the studied 
field, articles were reviewed according to the different theoretical concepts of agency 
theory and social exchange theory. Several theories or frameworks have been developed 
that offer useful insights in the complex relation between hospitals and physicians. In 
particular agency theory helps to understand and manage the cooperative structure of 
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their relationship (Pontes, 1995). Eisenhardt (1989) highly recommends incorporation of 
an agency perspective as it provides a unique, realistic and empirically testable 
perspective on problems of cooperative effort. More specific, the principles of agency 
theory provide a useful framework to study economic integration strategies (McLean, 
1989; Pontes, 1995). Although agency theory can be described as one of the most 
influential and widely used theories to study problems of relationships with a cooperative 
structure, additional theories can help to capture the greater complexity and improves 
understanding (Eisenhardt, 1989). In case of the management of HPRs, the importance of 
non-economic integration strategies is difficult to capture within the agency theory 
framework. The assumption of social exchange theory, that organizational treatment 
leads organizational members to alter their efforts toward helping their organization 
achieve its goals (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005; Gouldner, 1960) can be a very useful 
perspective for the study of these non-economic integration strategies. Finally, based on 
these theoretical and empirical findings a conceptual framework was developed to 
increase understanding and to inspire future research. Next to this theoretical contribution 
we undertook a review of the literature. This study draws upon the analysis of literature 
from the systematic review perspective and contributes to a more evidence based 
management of HPRs. Table 1 indicates the overall process of the systematic approach 
and study parameters. First, the search strategy started with electronic searches of 
PubMed, Web Of Science and EBSCO databases for studies explicitly linked to HPRs 
through the development of key search terms. The final search pattern was: [hospital* 
AND physician* AND (relation* OR alignment OR integration)]. In addition, reference 
lists of previous reviews, primary studies and key articles were checked. As a final check, 
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the electronic searches were repeated based on MeSH-term indexation of the studies 
identified and selected in the first stages. We restricted the studies eligible for inclusion 
to those published in peer-reviewed journals in English between January 1985 and 
December 2009. This time frame was selected because in this period new organizational 
arrangements with tighter affiliation between physicians and hospitals were initiated in 
Europe and the US (table I). Second, search results were filtered by title and narrowed 
down according to the inclusion/exclusion criteria. Finally, the researcher read each 
abstract and judged each article in terms of theory robustness and contribution to the 
proposed model. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory helps to understand and manage the cooperative structure of the HPR 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Pontes, 1995). In this ubiquitous relationship, one party delegates 
work to another, who performs the work (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The ‘principal’ 
hires an ‘agent’ with specialized skills or knowledge to perform the task in question. The 
agency problem occurs as agents have not exactly the same objectives and motivations as 
the principal, and consequently do not necessarily act in the best interest of the principal. 
The central concern of agency theory is how the principal can best motivate the agent to 
perform as the principal would prefer (Sappington, 1991). Because the unit of analysis is 
the contract between the principal and the agent, the focus of the theory is on the agent’s 
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opportunism and especially on how to determine the most efficient contractual 
relationship. This problem of cooperative effort is characterized by agency specific 
attributes on which the choice of alternative management modes depends. Within the 
classical agency theory, these attributes include risk and information asymmetry 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). However, to fully understand and capture the complexity of the 
relationship of hospitals with their medical staff, the classic agency theory should be 
adjusted for principal-professional exchanges. Professional agency relationships have 
additional complexity because they are characterized by knowledge asymmetry, which is 
distinctly different from information asymmetry and compounds the problem of not being 
able to judge the behavior of the professional agent (Sharma, 1997). As such, hospital 
management has limited ability to determine the appropriateness and the cost-
effectiveness of the decisions made by the clinicians (Pontes, 1995).  
These three attributes of the professional agency (risk, information - and knowledge 
asymmetry) are in turn related to the main assumptions of human behavior: bounded 
rationality, opportunism and risk aversion (Eisenhardt, 1989). Bounded rationality 
assumes that decision-makers have limited rationality when making decisions because of 
constraints on their cognitive capabilities. Simon (1972) distinguishes three limitations of 
rationality that affect human behavior; (1) uncertain consequences of decisions or 
behavior, (2) incomplete information about alternatives and (3) complexity of the 
economic situation. The second assumption about human behavior, opportunism, 
supposes that agents may be seeking to serve their self-interest and introduces the 
problem of moral hazard. If the principal cannot determine if the agent has behaved 
appropriately (due to information or knowledge asymmetry) and given the self-interest of 
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the agent, the agent may or may not behave as agreed upon. Moral hazard refers to lack 
of effort on the part of the agent. The argument here is that the agent may not put forth 
the agreed-upon effort which is called shirking (Eisenhardt, 1989). The third assumption, 
risk aversion refers to the agent’s attitudes towards risk bearing. In general the agent is 
considered to be more risk averse than the principal because of the (un)ability to diversify 
the encountered risks (Pontes, 1995). 
 
 Social Exchange Theory 
Although agency theory can be described as one of the most influential and widely used 
theories to study problems of relationships with a cooperative structure, additional theory 
can help to capture the greater complexity and improve understanding (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Given the difficulties in monitoring and more importantly evaluating the appropriateness 
and cost-effectiveness of medical behavior of physicians (Pontes, 1995), contractual 
arrangements only partly solve the principal agency problem. Sharma (1997) refers to 
imperfect alignment due to the fact that the more informed professional agent provides 
knowledge-intensive intangible service goods to a lay principal in which the requisite 
knowledge not can be purchased. Besides the fact that information asymmetry-reducing 
monitoring and control have severe limits in the context of principal professional 
exchange, they also can be counterproductive because of the negative feelings generated 
among relatively powerful professional agents (Sharma, 1997). More managerial research 
typically applies a ‘relational’ logic to the different arrangements (Zheng, Roehrich & 
Lewis, 2008). Contractual arrangements have been presented as a manifestation of power 
that can be effective in certain circumstances, but possibly promote conflict (Gaski, 1984) 
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and defensive behavior (Hirschman, 1984). The relational perspective emphasizes the 
role of trust in achieving mutually successful outcomes and lays the accent on the needed 
cooperative structure of their symbiotic relationship. These soft levers of noneconomic 
integration supplement the ‘hard’ levers of contractual economic integration proposed in 
agency theory. The ground rules for HPRs must be rooted in personal contacts that define 
physician expectations towards the organization in which they work. One compact that 
clinicians might like is that hospitals should seek management with physicians, not 
management of physicians. The related academic literature on the effects of 
psychological contracts concerns exchange agreements between an individual and the 
organization. Psychological contracts motivate employees to make behavioral 
commitments to the organizations, and the violation of such contracts leads employees to 
withdraw their support and perhaps leave (Burns et al. 2008). Social exchange theory 
suggests that organizational members tend to reciprocate beneficial treatment they 
receive with positive work-related behavior and tend to reciprocate detrimental treatment 
they receive with negative work-related behavior (Gouldner, 1960). Consistently with 
this view, employees’ perceptions of organizational support (POS) and perceptions of 
psychological contract violation (PPCV) are both constructs that are generally thought to 
be contributing to reciprocity dynamics. Both are firmly rooted in social exchange theory 
and are based on the assumption that organizational treatment leads organizational 
members to alter their efforts toward helping their organization achieve its goals (Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2005; Gouldner, 1960). POS is a construct that regards employees’ belief 
that their organization values their contributions and cares about their well-being, (PPCV) 
is a construct that regards employees’ feelings of disappointment (ranging from minor 
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frustration to betrayal) arising from their belief that their organization has broken its work 
related promises (Eisenberger, Huntington, Huntington, & Sowa, 1986).  
 
ANTECEDENTS OF INTEGRATION 
Risk 
At the heart of principal-agent theory lays the problem of transferring risk from the 
principal to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). To fully capture the role of risk in the HPR we 
need to broaden our focus with a second important principal, the purchaser of care (the 
government or health insurer). Boadway, Marchan & Sato (2004) refer to the two-tier 
hierarchy of principal agent interactions in hospital care delivery. The top one involves 
the government as principal to the hospital and medical doctors; the second involves the 
hospital (management) as principal to the medical staff. To be fully complete, additional 
relationships can be identified (Figure 2). A third principal agent relationship is the 
relationship of the physician and the patient, a fourth is the government that acts as agent 
for the patients or population. However, we make abstraction from these two last 
relationships by assuming that the latter are passive to the risk sharing problem 
(Boadway, Marchand, & Sato, 2004). Many countries have adopted reforms in which 
providers are placed at financial risk. Internationally, health care systems are currently 
reformed in order to provide social health insurers (or health authorities in countries with 
a national health service) with incentives and tools to contain costs while maintaining 
quality and universal access, resulting in ‘risk shifting’ of financial responsibility for the 
delivered care towards hospitals (KirkmanLiff et al., 1997). The different reimbursement 
methods result in various risk allocation between the three parties. In general, health care 
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systems evolved from cost-reimbursement, in which hospitals are fully reimbursed for all 
their medical costs, to prospective financing systems, making hospitals financially 
responsible for any extra expenditure above the fixed price per patient treated. 
Additionally, health care policy debate in many countries has concentrated on the pros 
and cons of introducing some form of ‘managed competition’ or ‘internal markets’ (Schut 
et al., 1999). In these managed care systems, pressures on hospitals were altered 
dramatically as underlying contract parameters and payment rates were no longer fixed, 
but determined by negotiation (Casalino et al., 2003). Due to these reforms, providers are 
confronted with a new type of risk, the price-risk. At the same time, recognition that the 
health care system suffers from serious gaps in quality has stimulated a broad array of 
initiatives to improve performance by fostering greater accountability on the part of 
providers and the development of value based purchasing (Lindenauer et al, 2007). The 
basic principle of a pay for quality program is to offer explicit financial incentives to 
health and health care providers in order to achieve predefined quality targets (Young, 
White, Burgess, Berlowitz, Meterko, Guldin et al., 2005). Physicians enjoy a monopoly 
in several major decision areas. Since they control so many patient care decisions that 
influence hospital costs and quality, and by extension hospital financial performance 
various organizational models were developed resulting in variable risk sharing (Dynan, 
Bazzoli & Burns, 1998). 
 
As a professional agent, physicians may see little value added form their ties to health 
care organizations without any risk condition. They even may view such connections as 
burdensome, if not antithetical to the traditional values of autonomy and freedom of 
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external control (Alexander, Waters, Boykin, Burns, Shortell, Gillies et al., 2001). 
Consequently the risk problem can be extended with the risk assumption of the physician. 
The risk assumption of physicians can be brought back to two of the main assumptions of 
human behavior in agency theory; bounded rationality and risk aversion. As outcomes in 
health care may not be influenced just by a physician’s actions, but also by factors that 
are beyond the physician’s control (e.g. individual differences in response to treatment, 
patient’s treatment compliance) consequences of medical decisions or some medical 
behavior may not be certain and uncertainty appears (Simon, 1972; Pontes, 1995). 
Agency theory assumes also that agents are risk averse (Harris & Raviv, 1979). This 
gives the possibility of shifting risk from the hospital to the professional agent who takes 
the clinical decisions. It is assumed that individuals are more risk averse than 
organizations (e.g. hospitals) because such organizations can diversify their risk (Pontes, 
1995). Consequently, if physicians are confronted with risk based payment schemes 
whereby the physicians are put at risk for at least part of the cost of patient’s care (e.g. 
capitation) they are more likely to strengthen their ties with the hospital. Physicians or 
physician groups who assume risk may have a greater need for the type of management 
services and supporting infrastructure that would enable them to manage this risk in an 
effective fashion. Under this view, risk assumption increases the degree of 
interdependence between physicians and systems, which in turn leads to greater 
alignment (Alexander et al., 2001).  Similarly physicians operate as quasi-independent 
professional agents in a physician group setting. They often assign their financial 
arrangements to intermediary organizations. This results also in ‘risk pools’ which can be 
defined as the number of individual physicians that are paid collectively and thus share 
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financial risk for the cost of patient care (Gold, 1999). Therefore, a distinction can be 
made by risk assumption at the individual physician level and the physician-group level 
because risk assumption may operate at different levels in organizational settings 
(Kralewski, Rich, Bernhardt, Dowd, Feldman & Johnson, 1998). Bounded rationality and 
risk aversion have also consequences for the internal financial agreement of the hospital 
and the medical specialist. In general within agency theory two types of compensation 
contracts can be distinguished; outcome-based control systems in which compensation is 
contingent primarily upon specified outcomes and behavior based control systems in 
which compensation is contingent primarily upon specified behaviors. As there may be 
considerable variation in health outcomes even when the amount and quality of the 
physician’s effort are high, outcome-based control systems that force them to absorb risk 
that their income may vary due to factors beyond their control is difficult. Also a very 
important is the effect on equity as outcome-based compensation systems may discourage 
physicians from accepting patients for treatment when they feel that these patients may 
not have favorable outcomes (Pontes, 1995). A second potential risk condition is the 
price risk within a managed competition environment. In search of increased bargaining 
leverage and hopefully, better contracts medical specialists and hospitals bundle their 
negotiation power (united we stand, divided we fall) by jointly going to the managed care 
market (Burns, Nash & Wholey, 2007). 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Trust 
Next to risk, trust has always been at the heart of the management field and is vital in 
examining the principal-professional exchange (Sharma, 1997). In case of the HPR, it is 
considered to be a social antecedent and critical concern of both hospitals and physicians 
(Shortell, Alexander, Budetti, Burns, Gillies, Waters, et al., 2001). Trust can be described 
as the willingness to be vulnerable to actions of another party, irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that other party (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). Economic 
integration strategies have previously been described as relatively weak and impersonal 
substitutes for trust. Although they may bring organizational legitimacy, they are often 
ineffective (Sitkin & Roth,  1993) and possibly promote conflict and defensive behavior 
(Hirschman, 1984). In our model, we conceptualized non-economic integration strategies 
as a complementary management approach, primarily rooted in social exchange theory. 
Trust has emerged as a central concept within this theory (Purunam & Vanneste, 2009) 
and it has been consistently mentioned as a predictor or antecedent of co-operative 
behavior  (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998) Agents are more likely to reciprocate 
beneficial treatment as their confidence grows that the other party can be trusted to 
exchange treatment equitably (Blau, 1964). Therefore, we argue that by including trust as 
an antecedent to the management of HPRs we increase significantly the explanatory 
power of our model. This statement is empirically confirmed by the research of Succi, 
Lee & Alexander, 1998. As such, we consider trust as a necessary condition for the 
development of non-economic integration strategies. In the longitudinal sense, trust can 
also be an outcome of non-economic integration strategies. For instance, by making their 
decision-making processes more participative and responsive and better inform clinicians 
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about management decisions to increase understanding, the hospital can build trust with 
their medical staff (Burns & Muller, 2008; Ibay, 2007).  
HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES 
Economic Integration 
Building further on the agency framework and the risk antecedent, we now concentrate 
on shared risk and gains in order to realize alignment. It is widely believed that the 
method of payment of physicians may affect their clinical and professional behavior 
(Gosden, Forland, Kristiansen, Sutton, Leese, Giuffrida et al., 2000). Accordingly, there 
are numerous articles in the literature examining the impact of various economic 
integration strategies on physician behavior (Armour, Pitts, Maclean, Cangialose, Kishel, 
Imai et al., 2001). However, the analysis of financial incentives cannot be separated from 
the base compensation scheme by which the providers are paid (Chaix-Couturier, 
Durand-Zaleski, Jolly & Durieux, 2000). This base compensation scheme creates its own 
incentives, which the supplemental economic incentives reinforce or counteract to realize 
increased alignment (Magnus, 1999). Consequently, the effect and use of economic 
incentives varies according to this base compensation. Given the variance in base 
compensation, this makes a review and interpretation of the findings about the effect of 
economic integration strategies difficult. We respond to this challenge by incorporating 
the macro level into the model by the risk antecedent. Based on agency theory, we argue 
that the base compensation scheme results in a varying risk distribution to the hospital 
and physician, creating the degree of needed supplementary economic alignment realized 
by an internal financial agreement. 
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Bonuses and Withholdings The use of explicit financial incentives to change 
physicians' behavior towards individual patients is common within managed care 
organizations (Gold, 1999; Gosden et al., 2000). In a managed care organization financial 
incentives usually take the form of bonuses paid over and above the physician’s base 
income from fee-for-service payments, capitation, or salary (Grumbach, Osmond, 
Vranizan, Jaffe & Bindman, 1998). These bonus payments are often drawn from 
surpluses in risk pools funded by “withholds” that is, funds deducted from physicians’ 
base payments or otherwise reserved under contracts in which physicians bear financial 
risk (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1996). We argue that, similarly, these payments can 
possibly encourage physicians to exert greater effort on behalf of the hospital. Our review 
indicates that, despite the growing popularity of strategies, few empirical studies have 
concentrated on the effectiveness of incentives in altering physician behavior. In addition, 
most studies have concentrated on primary care or preventive services. Although the 
treatment of specialist services has been inadequate (Shafrin, 2009), the findings of 
previous research indicate that the use of incentives can alter physician behavior. Firstly, 
there is evidence that implicit financial incentives, induced by the base compensation 
scheme (fee-for-service, capitation, salary), has an impact on physician resource use and 
quality of care; (Manning, Wells & Benjamin, 1987; Shen, Andersen, Brook, Kominski, 
Albert, & Wenger, 2004; Shrank, Ettner, Slavin & Kaplan, 2005; Hickson, Altemeier, & 
Perrin, 1987). Secondly, physician perceptions have indicated indirectly that they respond 
to incentives (Grumbach et al, 1998; Hadley, Mitchell, Sulmasy & Bloche, 1999). 
Finally, there is limited evidence that physicians respond to explicit incentives (Debrock 
& Arnould, 1992; Hillman, Pauly & Kerstein, 1989).  
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Gainsharing The ability to share savings resulting from cost-effective physician 
practice is an alternative bonus strategy that might reduce costs by aligning hospital and 
physician incentives (Wilensky, Wolter & Fischer, 2007). However, concerns remain 
about quality and access (Ketcham & Furukawa, 2008). A distinction can be made 
between physician gainsharing, in which the physician(group) receives payments, and 
service-line gainsharing, in which the  savings are (partially) directed back to the hospital 
service line or program where they were realized (Wilensky et al. 2007). Although it is a 
frequent advocated strategy to alter physician preference items (Burns, Housman, Booth 
& Koenig, 2009; Montgomery & Schneller, 2007) and has potential to align incentives in 
a pay for performance environment (Safavi, 2006a) empirical evidence remains scarce. 
Due to initial legal restrictions limiting or prohibiting diverse gainsharing initiatives in 
the US (Torgerson, 2008) we could only retrieve one empirical investigation of the effect 
of gain sharing programs. Ketcham and Furukawa (2008) found that gain sharing reduced 
hospital costs and patient outcomes did not change. The majority of savings resulted 
primarily from lower prices for devices and secondarily from fewer devices per patient. 
However, the patients’ treatment did not become more standardized.  
Participating Bond Transactions Recently, participating bond transactions were 
positioned as an alternative to traditional bonuses and gain sharing. These tax exempt 
high-yield bonds use a specific performance trigger in which the interest is only paid if 
certain targets are met. These goals that have been used include quality goals, financial 
and efficiency goals, and even cooperation with procedures goals such as use of a 
computerized order-entry systems (Safavi, 2006b). Unfortunately, we could not retrieve 
empirical evidence regarding this instrument.  
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Physician Ownership Financial incentives linked to ownership make physician 
potentially more sensitive to the quality and financial aspects of the entity. Next to the 
professional fees for performing their medical duties, physicians are also entitled to share 
in the costs and facility fees generated by the center in which they have invested (Strope, 
Daignault, Hollingsworth, Ye, Wei & Hollenbeck, 2009). This creates a direct link 
between ownership and costs (Ford & Kaserman, 2000), making physicians no longer 
isolated from the cost consequences of their clinical and operational decisions. Next to 
this financial aspect, researchers have argued that there is also a link between ownership 
and quality of delivered care. Proponents have argued that joint ventures are often 
undertaken to increase access for underserved groups (Ahern & Scott, 1994). Also, by 
severing the physician dual roles as both the residual claimant and the primary enforcer 
of quality of care, physician ownership could possible lead to improved quality of care 
(Ford et al., 2000). The review of the literature shows that financial incentives linked to 
ownership do affect physicians’ practice patterns. However, previous research has mainly 
focused on the ambulatory setting and the related self-referral issues when physician have 
ownership in facilities in which they not practice (e.g. anti-kickback and stark laws). The 
findings indicate that the supply-induced demand results in an increase in number of 
procedures, a shift to more lucrative procedures and that there is an adverse effect on 
patient’s access to care. However, up to now there is no empirical research on the effect 
of financial incentives linked to ownership on financial performance within a hospital 
setting (e.g. a service line). 
Medical group Previous research on physician incentives within a medical group 
identified the size and compensation structure of the medical group as an important 
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matter. Newhouse (1973) provided early evidence of ‘behavioral diseconomies of scale’ 
(or shirking) under equal-sharing arrangements as size increases. Given the ‘free-rider’ 
aspects of distributing of equal shares (group-based), this type of compensation has a 
substantially smaller effect on productivity than individual production based methods 
(Conrad, Sales, Liang, Chaudhuri, Maynard, Pieper et al., 2002). Unfortunately it is 
argued that the focus on personal performance creates a culture that places primary 
emphasis on the individual and their actions rather than on a group-centered culture that 
focuses on the synergistic benefits of individual and group successes It is however 
important to note that compensation based on group level performance can be difficult to 
implement because of the perception by physicians that they lack individual control of 
group performance (Alexander et al., 2001). 
 
Noneconomic Integration 
Theoretically rooted in social exchange theory, noneconomic integration strategies aim at 
optimizing the working relationship between the hospital and the medical staff. Research 
focusing on these strategies suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the 
underlying cooperative aspects of HPRs instead of the contractual, economic ties 
(Shortell et al., 2001). Within previous research, a distinction can be drawn between 
administrative linkages related to shared decision making and operational linkages 
focusing on supporting physicians in performing their profession (Alexander et al., 2001).  
Administrative linkages It is argued that the traditional dual hierarchy (Harris, 1977; 
(Scott,1982), where the hospital is managed by administrators and the physicians’ role is 
limited to practicing medicine, is no longer able to meet the needs of the fast-evolving 
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health care market (Lega & DePietro, 2005). Physicians are considered to be a source of 
critical information and exclusive knowledge about the performance of their tasks. 
Consequently their input can improve hospital decision making, strategic planning and 
hospital performance (Ashmos, Huonker & McDaniel, 1998; Ashmos & McDaniel, 
1991). Next to this direct effect resulting in better decision making, it can be argued that 
there are also important indirect effects on hospital performance. More specific, 
involving physicians in hospital decision making increases their fiduciary responsibility 
and exposure to tough decisions, both of which are likely to increase physician sensitivity 
to hospital performance (Smith, Reid & Piland, 1990). Moreover, involving physicians in 
hospital decision making may help to blend physician and management cultures 
(Montague, 1993). The physician-manager relationship has previously been described as 
‘a divide’ and an unhealthy ‘them and us’ culture (Atun, 2003). Involvement in decision 
making can contribute to the creation of a more cooperative decision-making 
environment and helps to build physician hospital commitment (Smith et al., 1990). 
Finally, greater affective or social-psychological involvement in hospital decision making 
is thought to build physician trust and loyalty in integration efforts (Montague, 1993), 
thereby decreasing conflict (Burns & Wholey, 1992). As a result it has been argued that 
physician involvement in planning and policymaking holds a great promise for aligning 
hospital and physician interests (Gregory, 1992).  
Operational linkages Aiming at providing value-added contributions to the 
physician(group), operational linkages can be valuable instrument to increase alignment. 
Operational support allows the group and its individual physicians to operate more 
effectively and efficiently in a complex and changing healthcare environment in which 
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they have to deal with a myriad of demands. These operational linkages create true 
interdependence by providing valued resources to the group, which results in increased 
organizational commitment from the physicians receiving these resources (Alexander et 
al. 2001). Next to this internal importance, it is argued that by improving the hospital’s 
internal environment, hospitals can dissuade physicians from taking their business 
outside the hospital. Consequently, direct competition with physician owned entities is 
avoided by making the hospital more attractive (Berenson, Ginsburg & May, 2007; 
Zuckerman, Hilberman, Andersen, Burns, Alexander & Torrens, 1998). However, 
notwithstanding these important aspects influence hospital performance, our review 
indicates that empirical research about these noneconomic integration strategies focusing 
on physician support is limited and inconclusive. Gilies et al. (1993) studied the effect of 
physician support on performance of organized delivery through their perceived 
effectiveness. These researchers developed the concept of functional integration referring 
to the extent that key support functions and activities are coordinated across operating 
units. They found a relationship between perceived integration and physician perceived 
effectiveness. Unfortunately, due to the cross-sectional design causality could not be 
assessed. Although this study was performed in an organized delivery system and 
performance was measured indirectly, these findings are potentially also relevant to the 
HPR. The findings of this study were more recently confirmed by an extended field 
investigation, highlighting the importance of operational linkages. More specific, this 
study found that violation of the hospitals’ administrative and professional obligations to 
support physicians in their practice increased the turnover of physicians and reduced 
satisfaction, productivity and commitment (Bunderson, 2001). 
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Physician Organizational Commitment 
Within the last 20 years, organizational commitment has emerged as a central concept in 
the study of work attitude and behavior. As our research focuses on hospital physician 
relationships and more specific alignment of the medical staff within the hospital, 
organizational commitment can be considered a useful construct to incorporate in our 
conceptual model. Furthermore, by placing organizational commitment within the wider 
conceptual framework we contribute to an increased understanding of the relationship 
between organizational commitment and various organizational behaviors (Solinger, Van 
Olffen & Roe, 2008). Although there are variable definitions of organizational 
commitment, they all build on the notion of the individual’s attachment or linkage to an 
organization (Swailes, 2002). Traditionally the management literature has analyzed these 
relations as individual-organization linkages, in which individuals exchange professional 
contributions and effort for psychological and material inducements. These psychological 
contracts are generally viewed as committing individuals to the relation (Allen & John, 
1990). The research community has largely adopted this view such that high commitment 
has effectively become equated with positive feelings towards the organization and its 
values. In essence, it can be described as an assessment of the congruence between an 
individual’s own values and beliefs and those of the organization (Swailes, 2002). As 
such it is possible that physician commitment is a necessary foundation for achieving the 
anticipated benefits of the various integration strategies. Consequently, physician-hospital 
commitment acts as an intermediate hospital performance outcome resulting in revenue 
enhancement, cost containment and quality improvement (Burns et al., 2008). In our 
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conceptual model, we follow this view in which commitment is the outcome of the 
linkages of physicians and the organization, and not the linkages per se. We consider 
commitment as an intermediate outcome of non-economic integration strategies and 
economic integration strategies, which ultimately leads to higher hospital performance. 
Theoretically, the dominant model in organizational commitment was conceptualized by 
Allen and Meyer (1990). They developed the three-component model of organizational 
commitment, on the basis of the idea that organizational commitment comes in three 
distinct forms; affective, continuance and normative commitment. Initially a distinction 
was made between affective and continuance commitment, and the affective component 
defined as the emotional attachment to, identification with and involvement in the 
organization and continuance commitment defined as the perception of costs associated 
with leaving the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1984) Later they added the third 
distinguishable component, normative commitment which refers to the feelings of 
obligation to remain with the organization (Allen et al., 1990). This model has received 
considerable empirical support (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky, 2002; 
Wasti, 2005). The most important rationale for the development of this model is that, all 
three forms of commitment relate differently to measures of other work-related behaviors 
(e.g. organizational citizenship behavior).  In general, affective commitment is expected 
to have the strongest positive relation, followed by normative commitment; continuance 
commitment is expected to be unrelated, or even to have a small negative relation, to 
desirable work behaviors and performance (Meyer et al. 2002). Based on these findings, 
it can be argued that there is little to be gained by fostering continuance commitment in 
employees. The limited empirical research about the influence of economic integration 
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strategies on physician organizational commitment supports this argument. Several 
studies conclude that equity ownership (Alexander et al., 2001), risk sharing (Alexander 
et al., 2001) and the use of incentives results in few differences in organizational 
commitment (Alexander et al. 2001; Burns, Alexander, Shortell, Zuckerman, Budetti, 
Gillies et al., 2001; Burns et al., 1992). These findings question the utility of economic 
integration strategies in directly increasing physician commitment to the hospital.  More 
importantly, Alexander and colleagues (2001) found bonuses and withholds that hold 
individual physicians accountable for their behaviors, generate the opposite results, 
reducing behavioral commitment of physicians to hospitals. This is consistent with the 
reported small negative effect of continuance commitment on desirable work behaviors 
and performance (Meyer et al., 2002). In light of these findings, It is important for future 
research to investigate the extent to which high levels of continuance commitment 
weakens the positive impact of both affective and normative commitment (Wasti, 2005; 
Burns et al., 2001). If there is an important negative effect, hospital management may be 
faced with the choice of realizing short-term productivity benefits, realized by incentives, 
versus benefits of long term commitment. If this is the case, in the long run these 
economic alignment mechanisms may backfire on organizations that wish to promote 
long term relations between the physicians and the organization. 
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The above theoretical arguments and model combined with the results of previous 
research indicate directions for future research that need to be explored further. First, 
compared to economic integration, few research studies have focused on noneconomic 
 29 
integration strategies. It has been argued that approaches that recognize and meet 
physicians' professional career needs to build their practices appear to be successful in 
achieving greater alignment (Shortell et al., 2001). Taking into account the rule of 
reciprocity of social exchange theory, we argue that future research should focus on the 
effects of noneconomic integration. More specifically the constructs of perceived 
organizational support and perceived psychological contract violation may prove to be 
fertile ground for future research (Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005). 
Second, little is still known about the effects of economic integration strategies in 
realizing direct hospital physician alignment. Recent research suggests that explicit 
financial incentives coincided with a significant change in practice (e.g. Ketcham and 
Furukawa, 2008). These findings should be tested empirically within a hospital context. 
Future research should investigate the difference between the different instruments and 
the effect of the size of payment (Magnus, 1999). In addition, this research should 
incorporate both the individual and the physician-group level and investigate the 
appropriate mix of financial arrangements within these groups (Alexander et al., 2001; 
Gold, 1999).  
Third, when investigating physician-hospital integration, both economic and 
noneconomic integration strategies should be included. While a few researchers do 
incorporate both integration strategies to investigate their impact on overall integration 
(Mark et al. 1998), they generally do not incorporate the interrelationship between these 
integration strategies. Moreover, they do not use the more recent and practical 
classification scheme proposed by Burns & Muller (2008), used within our conceptual 
framework. Considering the possible interaction effect, future research should investigate 
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both integration strategies simultaneously. We argue that the construct of organizational 
commitment could increase understanding of the interplay between both approaches. 
More specifically, the three component model of Allen and Meyer (1990) provides the 
possibility to measure the effect of both types of integration strategies. Although 
organizational commitment is a major focus of research (Meyer et al. 2002), little is 
known about physician organizational commitment. As indicated above, previous 
research is scarce and concentrated mainly on personal characteristics instead of 
organizational factors. Future research needs to clarify the importance of the construct 
and the influence on physician performance and ultimately on hospital performance. This 
highly needed research would make an important contribution in the practical 
understanding of HPRs and would clarify the inter-relationship between economic -, 
noneconomic integration and performance outcomes in a hospital setting.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study we aimed to rethink the management of HPRs. It extends current research by 
developing a conceptual model incorporating both economic and noneconomic 
integration. In doing so, this study challenges scholars and practitioners to consider the 
complexity inherent to the management of HPRs more holistically. Specifically, we argue 
that both strategies should be seen as complementary, rather than a substitution to each 
other. However, no empirical study or conceptual article has combined both management 
approaches. Our model provides a parsimonious structure for integrating both 
approaches. On the one hand, building on agency theory we incorporated risk as an 
important antecedent to economic integration. We emphasize the importance of the 
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physician group level resulting in risk pooling (Gold, 1999), the blending of financial 
incentives (Robinson et al., 2004) and the associated behavioral diseconomies of scale 
(Conrad et al. 2004). On the other hand, we incorporated trust as an important antecedent 
to noneconomic integration strategies (Zuckerman et al., 1998). Building on social 
exchange theory we apply the principle of reciprocity to HPRs. We operationalized this 
indirect effect on hospital performance by incorporating the construct of physician 
hospital commitment. Although effective relationships are built on trust and commitment 
(Gillies et al., 2001) there has been little research focusing on noneconomic integration 
strategies. We suggest future research should primarily focus on noneconomic integration 
strategies and the interaction effect with economic integration.  
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Table 1 
 
Stage 1- Bibliographical databases selected 
- Web of Science, Pub Med and EBSCO 
Stage 2 – Time frame 
- We restricted the studies eligible for inclusion to those published between January 1989 and June 2009. This time frame was selected 
because in this period new organizational arrangements with tighter affiliation between physicians and hospitals were initiated in the US as a 
response to managed care (Berenson, Ginsberg & May, 2007; Casalino & Robinson, 2003). In the same period Health Care policy debate in 
European countries also concentrated on the pros and cons of introducing some form of ‘managed competition’ or ‘internal markets’ to 
enhance efficiency of health care delivery and to contain costs (Schut & van Doorslaer, 1999). 
Stage 3 – Search words used for coverage of databases 
- ‘Physician* AND hospital* AND (relation* OR alignment OR integration) 
Stage 4 – Articles filtered 
- Search results were narrowed by title. Duplicates were removed, and the search results were further narrowed according to: 
(1) Inclusion criteria stipulated that citations should be: a peer reviewed English journal, across US or Europe and be conceptual, 
quantitative or qualitative. 
(2) Exclusion criteria stipulated that citations cannot be: industry extracts, or scholarly publications focussing the relation between 
primary care physicians and hospitals or vertical integration to organized delivery systems. 
Stage 5 – Analysis 
Abstracts of relevant citations were read and classified in two categories (directly relevant and less relevant). Only the directly relevant citations were 
included for the review. 
